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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______________
No. 18-3440
______________
M.G. AND D.G. ON BEHALF OF M.G.,
Appellants
v.
NORTH HUNTERDON-VOORHEES REGIONAL HIGH
SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION
______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 3:17-cv-12018)
District Judge: Hon. Peter G. Sheridan
______________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 4, 2019
Before: JORDAN, BIBAS, and MATEY, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: June 20, 2019)
______________
OPINION*
______________

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does
not constitute binding precedent.

MATEY, Circuit Judge.
This matter presents a challenge to the terms of Individualized Educational Plans
(“IEP”) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C.
§ 1401. Appellants, the parents of M.G., appeal the District Court’s order denying their
motion for summary judgment and granting North Hunterdon–Voorhees Regional High
School District Board of Education’s (“District”) motion for summary judgment. Finding
no error in the District Court’s conclusions, we will affirm.
I.
We begin by summarizing the facts. Since 2015, the District has provided M.G.
services under an IEP. The District serves students from multiple municipalities in
Hunterdon County, New Jersey, including the municipality where M.G. resides. Through
M.G.’s first year of high school, a program suited to her needs was unavailable within the
district. Instead, M.G. attended the Developmental Learning Center (“DLC”) in Warren,
New Jersey. In February 2016, the District issued a new IEP (“2016 IEP”) requiring M.G.
to attend a program in the District beginning with the 2016–17 school year. M.G.’s
parents objected to the 2016 IEP and challenged the proposal (“2016 IEP Petition”) with
the New Jersey Department of Education (the “Department”).
Under the IDEA, that challenge stayed the proposed transfer so M.G. remained
enrolled at the DLC for the 2016–17 school year. In April 2017, while the 2016 IEP
Petition was pending, the District issued a revised IEP (“2017 IEP”) and again directed
M.G. to attend a program in the District. M.G.’s parents filed a second challenge (“2017
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IEP Petition”) with the Department. As a result of this new petition, M.G. continued to
attend DLC during the 2017–18 school year.
The Department transferred both the 2016 IEP Petition and 2017 IEP Petition to
the Office of Administrative Law. An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) consolidated
the petitions and conducted a three-day hearing in August 2017. As the hearing took
place after the 2016–17 school year, the ALJ found the objections to the 2016 IEP moot
and reviewed only the 2017 IEP. The ALJ heard testimony from several witnesses,
including multiple experts on behalf of both parties. The District’s witnesses included a
school psychologist; a clinical psychologist and behavior specialist; and the Director of
Special Education for the District. Appellants presented the testimony of M.G.’s father,
as well as expert testimony from a clinical psychologist.
Following the hearing, the ALJ dismissed both petitions and concluded that the
2017 IEP provided M.G. with “significant learning and meaningful educational benefit[s]
in light of M.G.’s individual needs and potential.” (App. 245.) M.G.’s parents appealed
the ALJ’s determination in federal court under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A), and the District
Court granted summary judgment for the District. M.G.’s parents timely appealed.
II.
A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
Our analysis begins with an outline of the scope of our review. We have
jurisdiction to review the final order of the District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Under
the IDEA, “[w]e review a district court’s findings of fact for clear error, but we exercise
plenary review over the legal standards that the district court applies and over its legal
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conclusions.” D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 564 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing
Mary T. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 575 F.3d 235, 242 (3d Cir. 2009)). “A finding of fact is
clearly erroneous when, after reviewing the evidence, the court of appeals is left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Shore Reg’l High Sch.
Bd. of Educ. v. P.S. ex rel. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Oberti v. Bd.
of Educ. of the Borough of Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 1204, 1220 (3d Cir. 1993)).
B. Appellant’s Arguments
M.G.’s parents raise three arguments on appeal. First, they contend that the
District Court applied the incorrect standard of review. Second, they argue that the ALJ
failed to give appropriate weight to the testimony of M.G.’s father. Finally, they assert
that the District Court and the ALJ erred by ignoring testimony and evidence relating to
the February 2016 IEP. We address each argument in turn.
1. The IDEA Standard of Review
We begin with the standard of review. When reviewing a decision of a state
administrative agency under the IDEA, district courts apply a “modified de novo” review.
D.S., 602 F.3d at 564. “Under this standard, a district court must give ‘due weight’ and
deference to the findings in the administrative proceedings.” Id. (citations omitted). The
factual findings of the administrative proceeding “are to be considered prima facie
correct,” a standard that “prevents district courts from imposing their own view[s] of
preferable educational methods on the states.” Id. If neither party presents additional
evidence, the district court bases its decision on the evidence developed in the
administrative proceeding. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C). The party challenging an
4

administrative decision bears the burden of persuasion and “faces the additional hurdle of
overcoming a presumption that the Hearing Officer’s findings were correct.” Andrew M.
v. Del. Cty. Office of Mental Health & Retardation, 490 F.3d 337, 345 (3d Cir. 2007).
Here, M.G.’s parents contend the District Court erred by straying from these
principles and incorporating the standard for summary judgment under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. While the District Court restated the standard for summary judgment
in reviewing the parties’ motions, the Court also recognized that “[t]he standard of review
applied in an appeal of an administrative decision under the IDEA differs from the
ordinary summary judgment standard.” (App. at 6.) And the District Court made clear
that it was “[a]pplying the modified de novo review” in finding that M.G.’s parents had
not overcome the deference given to the ALJ’s factual findings. (Id. at 11.) This is the
standard the IDEA requires, and we find no error in the District Court’s conclusion.
2. Parental Testimony
We turn next to the testimony of M.G.’s father. Although the District Court
applies a modified de novo standard when reviewing the decision of an ALJ in an IDEA
case, “when, as here, an ALJ has heard live testimony and determined that one witness is
more credible than another witness, [the ALJ’s] determination is due special weight.”
D.S., 602 F.3d at 564 (citing Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 381 F.3d at 199).
“Specifically, this means that a District Court must accept the state agency’s credibility
determinations unless the non-testimonial, extrinsic evidence in the record would justify a
contrary conclusion.” Id. (quoting Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 381 F.3d at 199)
(emphasis in original) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The District Court is
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“not at liberty to credit the witnesses who expressed a contrary opinion without a
showing that there was a good reason to do so[.]” Id. at 568. Rather, “the applicable
standard of review [is] essentially the same as that a federal appellate court applies when
reviewing a trial court’s findings of fact.” Id. at 564 (citing Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of
Educ., 381 F.3d at 199).
While M.G.’s parents argue that the ALJ failed to give appropriate weight to the
testimony of M.G.’s father, they did not present any new evidence to the District Court
and relied instead on the record from the administrative hearing. The District Court’s
review of witnesses, and the weight to accord their testimony, was thus limited to the
administrative record. The record reveals no non-testimonial extrinsic evidence that
clearly shows that the ALJ was mistaken, so the District Court appropriately deferred to
the ALJ’s credibility determinations. And the ALJ gave due attention to the concerns
M.G.’s father raised about M.G.’s safety and her potential for elopement. Relying on the
testimony of the school psychologist, the ALJ determined that the risk of elopement was
suitably addressed by the one-to-one aid outlined in the 2017 IEP. There was no error in
the District Court’s deference to the ALJ’s findings.
3. The 2016 IEP
Finally, M.G.’s parents argue the District Court erred by affirming the ALJ’s
decision to focus the hearing on the 2017 IEP and to ignore testimony and evidence
relating to the development of the 2016 IEP. The 2016 IEP proposed transitioning M.G.
for the 2016–2017 school year; the 2016 IEP Petition opposed that plan and requested the
sole remedy of “maintain[ing] the current appropriate placement at DLC Warren.” (App.
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at 316.) By the time the hearing began in August 2017, M.G. had finished the 2016–2017
school year at DLC. Since M.G. received the relief requested, the petition was moot, and
it was appropriate for the ALJ to focus on the 2017 IEP Petition. See Donovan ex rel.
Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336 F.3d 211, 216 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[A] case is
moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally
cognizable interest in the outcome.” (alteration in original) (quoting Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)).
III.
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s decision.
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